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bstract
This paper revisits the issue of exchange rate regimes in emerging Asia over the decade 1999–2009. It finds that while Asia is home to a wide
rray of exchange rate regimes, there are signs of gradual movement toward somewhat greater exchange rate flexibility in many of the regional
ountries. There appears to be evidence of an apparent “fear of appreciation” which is manifested in asymmetric exchange rate intervention—i.e., a
illingness to allow depreciations but reluctance to allow appreciations. This policy of effective exchange rate undervaluation is rather unorthodox
rom a neoclassical sense, but is consistent with a development policy centered on suppressing the price of non-tradable goods relative to tradables
i.e., real exchange rate undervaluation).2012 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of Africagrowth Institute.
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 Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.. Introduction
Maintaining a stable and “competitive” exchange rate has
een one of the cornerstones of Asian industrialization strate-
ies starting with Japan in its high-growth period from 1950
o 1973, and largely emulated by the Republic of Korea (Korea
ereafter) and some of the other newly industrializing economies
 This paper draws on and builds upon earlier work by the author for the
sian Development Bank (ADB) as well as joint work by the author with Javier
erverinotti, Tony Cavoli, and Victor Pontines. Comments on an earlier draft by
an Kim Song and other participants at the ADB-ISEAS workshop are appre-
iated. Excellent research assistance by Sasidaran Gopalan is also gratefully
cknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies.
 The paper was initially published as ADBI Working Paper Series No. 322,
ovember 2011.
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ersity (GMU), MSN 3B1, 3351N. Fairfax Drive, Arlington, VA 22201, USA.
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 Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.NIEs) in the 1970s and 1980s. The “near NIEs” in Southeast
sia—Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand, which had effectively
egged their currencies to the US dollar—benefitted signifi-
antly from a revaluation of the Japanese yen following the
laza Accord of 1984–1985 as Japanese foreign direct invest-
ent (FDI) moved offshore to maintain export competitiveness.
his flood of Japanese FDI helped kick-start growth in the
egion, which continued until the Asian crisis in 1997. More
ecently, the People’s Republic of China’s (hereafter, PRC)
evaluation of the yuan in January 1994, and its continued
eg to the US dollar until recently, has, it has been argued,
elped transform the country into the world’s factory and export
owerhouse.
This paper revisits the issue of exchange rate regimes in
merging Asia.1 The paper is divided into two main parts. The
rst part of the paper (Sections 2 and 3) compares the de jure
nd de facto exchange rate regimes in selected emerging Asian
conomies. An enduring question in the literature on exchange
ate regimes is: how do official classifications compare with de
acto regimes? The paper facilitates this comparison by present-
ng an analysis of the degree of de facto exchange rate flexibility
n the exchange rate regimes for emerging Asian economies. To
1 We limit ourselves to a subset of Asian currencies for which comparable data
re more easily available: Bangladesh, PRC, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia,
akistan, the Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Viet Nam.
5 lopme
p
a
o
fl
p
m
i
a
e
e
c
o
r
2
s
c
p
e
i
t
i
o
p
a
l
r
r
m
t
e
t
E
t
t
w
l
i
2
A
2
r
s
I
R
v
1
d
e
i
s
c
o
n
w
c
i
T
s
t
K
t
S
r
S
a
K
r
A
w
t
s
A
e
a
B
r
t
n
b
r
e
t
b
a
b
b
w
t
i
a
A
3 The data has since been applied retroactively to 1990.
4 The descriptions in Table 1 are mostly direct quotes from official sources
and not paraphrased by the author.
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review the main conclusion, it is evident that Asia is home to
wide array of exchange rate regimes, though there are signs
f a gradual movement toward somewhat greater exchange rate
exibility in many of the regional countries. Nonetheless, the
ropensity for foreign exchange intervention and exchange rate
anagement among regional central banks remains fairly high
n many instances, particularly in terms of managing against
currency basket (i.e., maintaining a stable nominal effective
xchange rate, or NEER).
However, beyond a general reluctance of many Asian
conomies to allow for a “benign neglect” of their curren-
ies both in terms of managing volatility as well as in terms
f “leaning against the wind,” the sustained stockpiling of
eserves in developing and emerging Asian economies since
000 (interrupted only briefly by the global financial crisis)
uggests that they are more sensitive to exchange rate appre-
iations than to depreciations. This is the focus of the second
art of the paper (Sections 4 and 5). Section 4 empirically
xplores the particular issue of this asymmetry in exchange rate
ntervention in developing and emerging Asia. We find there
o be evidence of an evolution of Asian exchange rate pol-
cy towards an apparent “fear of floating in reverse” or “fear
f appreciation” (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2007). This
olicy of exchange rate undervaluation is rather unorthodox,
nd at odds with most neoclassical/mainstream wisdom, which
ikely would recommend that policymakers aim to keep the
eal exchange rate (RER) as close as possible to its equilib-
ium level, as any sort of misalignment could in theory create
acroeconomic disruptions. Specifically, according to conven-
ional wisdom, RER overvaluation stifles economic growth and
xport competitiveness while persistent undervaluation leads
o inflationary concerns. Section 5 reconsiders the PRC’s and
ast Asia’s unorthodox development, which has been cen-
ered on suppressing the price of non-tradable goods relative
o tradables (RER undervaluation). The final section concludes
ith a few observations on Asian currency management in
ight of the global financial crisis and concerns about global
mbalances.
. Exchange rate regimes in developing and emerging
sia2
.1. De jure classiﬁcations
Until 1998 it was fairly easy to obtain de jure exchange
ate classifications, as this data was compiled from national
ources by the IMF. Specifically, between 1975 and 1998, the
MF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange
estrictions was based on self-reporting of national policies by
arious governments, with revisions in 1977 and 1982. Since
998—and in response to criticisms that there can be significant
ivergences between de facto and de jure policies—the IMF’s
xchange rate classification methodology has shifted to compil-
ng unofficial policies of countries as determined by the Fund
2 This section is based on Rajan (2010).
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taff.3 While the change in IMF exchange rate coding is wel-
ome for many reasons (including the fact that the new set
f categories is more detailed than the older one), the IMF
o longer compiles a list of the de jure regimes. The only
ay this can be done is by referring to the website of each
entral bank or other national sources individually, and wad-
ng through relevant materials. The results are summarized in
able 1.4
As is apparent, the de jure exchange rate regimes in Asia
pan a wide spectrum. Many smaller Asian economies appear
o prefer some form of single currency pegs. This is true of Hong
ong, China (whose currency board arrangement is pegged to
he US dollar), as well as others like Brunei (pegged to the
ingapore dollar) and Bhutan and Nepal (pegged to the Indian
upee) and Myanmar (pegged to Special Drawing Rights, or
DR). In contrast, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka in South Asia
nd the East and Southeast Asian economies of Indonesia,
orea, and the Philippines officially operate flexible exchange
ate regimes. The flexible exchange rates in the three East
sian countries are accompanied by inflation-targeting frame-
orks. Thailand too operates an inflation targeting arrangement,
hough it defines itself officially as a managed floater. Table 2
ummarizes some key components of the inflation targeters in
sia.5
A number of other Asian countries have adopted a vari-
ty of intermediate regimes (currency baskets, crawling bands,
djustable pegs, etc.). For instance, according to the Reserve
ank of India (RBI), India “monitors and manages the exchange
ates with flexibility without a fixed target or a pre-announced
arget or a band, coupled with the ability to intervene if and when
ecessary.”6 Viet Nam officially maintains a crawling peg and
and around the US dollar. Singapore officially manages its cur-
ency against a basket of currencies, with the trade-weighted
xchange rate used as an intermediate target to ensure that
he inflation target is attained.7 While Singapore’s currency
asket regime follows a more strategic orientation, both PRC
nd Malaysia in July 2005 officially shifted to what may be
est referred to as a more mechanical version of a currency
asket regime (i.e., keeping the trade-weighted exchange rate
ithin a certain band as a goal in and of itself). Pakistan seems
o operate rather ad hoc adjustable pegs. Overall, therefore,
t is readily apparent that “one size does not necessarily fit
ll” when it comes to the choice of exchange rate regimes in
sia.Roger (2009) offers a useful overview of the achievements and challenges
aced by countries that have adopted inflation targeting frameworks over the last
wo decades.
6 See Cavoli and Rajan (2009, Chapter 4) for an analysis of India’s exchange
ate regime.
7 See Cavoli and Rajan (2009, Chapter 5) for an analysis of Singapore’s
xchange rate regime.
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Table 1
De jure Exchange Rate Regimes in Asia (As per Country Central Bank Websites unless otherwise stated).
Country Official Policy Pronouncements (direct quotes)
Bangladesh The exchange rates of the taka for inter-bank and customer transactions are set by the dealer banks themselves, based on Demand
and-supply interaction. The Bangladesh Bank is not present in the market on a day-to-day basis and undertakes purchase or sale
transactions with the dealer banks only as needed to maintain orderly market conditions.
PRC PRC announced on July 21, 2005 the adoption of a managed floating exchange rate regime based on market supply and demand with
reference to a basket of currencies. Since then, the new exchange rate system has operated stably, and the RMB exchange rate has been
kept basically stable at an adaptive and equilibrium level. The exchange rate of the RMB against the US dollar has been moving both
upward and downward with greater flexibility.
Hong Kong, SAR Since 1983 the Hong Kong dollar has been linked to the US dollar at the rate of HK$7.8 to US$ 1. The link is maintained through the
operation of a strict and robust Currency Board system which requires both the stock and the flow of the Monetary Base to be fully backed
by foreign reserves. Any change in the size of the Monetary Base has to be fully matched by a corresponding change in the foreign reserves.
India The exchange rate policy in recent years has been guided by the broad principles of careful monitoring and management of exchange rates
with flexibility, without a fixed target or a pre-announced target or a band, coupled with the ability to intervene if and when necessary.
Indonesia In July 2005, Bank Indonesia launched a new monetary policy framework known as the Inflation targeting framework, which has four basic
elements as follows: (1) use of the BI rate as a reference rate in monetary control in replacement of the base money operational target, (2)
forward looking monetary policymaking process, (3) more transparent communications strategy, and (4) strengthening of policy
coordination with the Government. The rupiah exchange rate is determined wholly by market supply and demand. However, Bank
Indonesia is able to take some actions to keep the rupiah from undergoing excessive fluctuation.
Korea Inflation targeting is an operating framework of monetary policy in which the central bank announces an explicit inflation target and
achieves its target directly. This is based on the recognition that to achieve sustainable economic growth, it is important above all else those
inflation expectations, which have a great effect on wage and price decisions, should be stabilized. In this regard, inflation targeting places
great emphasis on inducing inflation expectations to converge on the central bank’s inflation target level by the prior public announcement
and successful attainment of that target level. The exchange rate is, in principle, decided by the interplay of supply and demand in the
foreign exchange markets. However, the Bank of Korea implements smoothing operations to deal with abrupt swings in the exchange rate
caused by temporary imbalances between supply and demand, or radical changes in market sentiment.
Malaysia On 21 July 2005, Malaysia shifted from a fixed exchange rate regime of US$1 = RM 3.80 to a managed float against a basket of currencies.
Under the managed float system, the ringgit exchange rate is largely determined by ringgit demand and supply in the foreign exchange
market. The Central Bank does not actively manage or maintain the exchange rate at any particular level – economic fundamentals and
market conditions are the primary determinants of the level of the ringgit exchange rate. In this regard, the Central Bank intervenes only to
minimize volatility, and to ensure that the exchange rate does not become fundamentally misaligned.
Pakistana Pakistan has adopted the floating inter-bank exchange rate as the preferred option since 2001. State Bank of Pakistan has attempted to
maintain real effective exchange rate at a level that keeps the competitiveness of Pakistani exports intact. But, like other Central Banks, it
does intervene from time to time to keep stability in the market and smooth excessive fluctuations. The current framework of
monetary-cum-exchange rate policies and the underlying economic analysis in Pakistan can, thus, be broadly characterized as judgment-
and discretion-based rather than model- or rule-based.
Philippines The primary objective of Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas’ monetary policy is to promote a low and stable inflation conducive to a balanced and
sustainable economic growth. The adoption of inflation targeting framework for monetary policy in January 2002 is aimed at achieving this
objective. The Monetary Board determines the exchange rate policy of the country, determines the rates at which the Bangko Sentral buys
and sells spot exchange, and establishes deviation limits from the effective exchange rate or rates as it deems proper.
Singapore Since 1981, monetary policy in Singapore has been centered on the management of the exchange rate. (1) The Singapore dollar is managed
against a basket of currencies of its major trading partners and competitors. (2) The Monetary Authority of Singapore operates a managed
float regime for the Singapore dollar. The trade-weighted exchange rate is allowed to fluctuate within an undisclosed policy band, rather
than kept to a fixed value. (3) The exchange rate policy band is periodically reviewed to ensure that it remains consistent with the
underlying fundamentals of the economy. (4) The choice of the exchange rate as the intermediate target of monetary policy implies that
MAS gives up control over domestic interest rates (and money supply).
Sri Lanka The Central Bank continues to conduct its monetary policy under an independently floating exchange rate regime within a framework of
targeting monetary aggregates with reserve money (i.e., high powered money) as the operating target and broad money (M2b) as the
intermediate target.
Thailand Since July 2, 1997, Thailand has adopted the managed-float exchange rate regime, in which the value of the baht is determined by market
forces, namely demand and supply in both on-shore and off-shore foreign exchange market, to let the currency move in line with economic
fundamentals. The Bank of Thailand will intervene in the market only when necessary, in order to prevent excessive volatilities and achieve
economic policy targets. Under the inflation targeting framework, the Bank of Thailand implements its monetary policy by influencing
short-term money market rates via the selected key policy rate, currently set at the 14-day repurchase rate.
Viet Nam Viet Nam has adopted a crawling peg with the US dollar for its exchange rate. The State Bank of Viet Nam sets the official exchange rate
daily, and commercial banks set their dealing rate within a trading band of plus or minus 0.25 percent. The State Bank of Viet Nam tends to
keep the dong depreciated against the US dollar by keeping the exchange rate on an upward trend.
Source: Compiled by the author with the assistance of Sasidaran Gopalan and Nicola Virgill from websites from various central banks, Ministries of Finance and
other official sources, with minor modifications. Most central Bank websites available here: http://www.bis.org/cbanks.htm. Based on Rajan (2010).
a Based on speech by former Pakistan central bank Governor (Husain, 2005).
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Table 3
De facto IMF Exchange Rate Classifications as of April 2008.
Country As of April 31, 2008
Bangladesh Other conventional fixed peg arrangement
PRC Crawling peg.
Hong Kong, SAR Currency board arrangement.
India Managed floating with no pre-determined path
for the exchange rate.
Indonesia Managed floating with no pre-determined path
for the exchange rate.
Japan Independently floating.
Korea Independently floating.
Malaysia Managed floating with no pre-determined path
for the exchange rate.
Pakistan Managed floating with no pre-determined path
for the exchange rate.
Philippines Independently floating.
Singapore Managed floating with no pre-determined path
for the exchange rate.
Sri Lanka Other conventional fixed peg arrangement.
Thailand Managed floating with no pre-determined path
for the exchange rate.
Viet Nam Other conventional fixed peg arrangement.
Source: IMF data on Classification of Exchange Rate Arrangements and Mon-
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.2. De facto classiﬁcations
As noted, the IMF has replaced its compilation of de jure
xchange rate regimes with the behavioral classification of
xchange rates. The new IMF coding is based on various
ources, including information from IMF staff, press reports,
ther relevant papers, as well as the behavior of bilateral nominal
xchange rates and reserves.8 As is apparent from a comparison
f Tables 1 and 3, there is no discrepancy between the de jure
nd de facto regimes of Hong Kong, China, which operates an
xchange rate fixed to the US dollar. Similarly, India, Malaysia,
akistan, Singapore, and Thailand are categorized as managed
oaters, broadly consistent with their official pronouncements.
orea and the Philippines are characterized as independent
oaters, consistent with their official assertions but somewhat
dd in view of the fact that both countries have been rapidly
uilding up reserves. There are, however, divergences from the
fficial pronouncements. According to the public statements of
he PRC’s authorities, the exchange rate regime is a based on
currency basket, though the IMF classifies the PRC’s system
s a crawling peg.9 Viet Nam is classified as having a conven-
ional fixed peg regime compared to its official pronouncement
f maintaining a crawling peg and band around the US dollar.
angladesh, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka have also been character-
zed as managed floaters (with no predetermined exchange rate
ath), despite their official declarations of being independent
8 Bubula and Ötker-Robe (2002) appears to be the intellectual basis for the
MF de facto regimes. Also see Barajas et al. (2008) for a summary overview
f the various methodologies to classify exchange rates regimes.
9 See Eichengreen (2006) who provides a broader discussion of issues sur-
ounding the PRC’s currency and its exchange rate regime.
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oaters.10 Overall, with a few exceptions, most developing and
merging Asian exchange rate regimes are, according to the IMF,
ither completely fixed (soft or hard) or managed.
. De facto exchange rate regimes
This section presents a measure that has been recently used
n Frankel and Wei (2007) as a way of11 incorporating exchange
ate regime flexibility (or fixity) into the original Frankel–Wei
2004) method for inferring implicit basket weights.
.1. Model
Consider the following:
ntervention Index = e + r (3.1)
here12 e is defined as the (log difference of the) local currency
er some independent numeraire—here we use the SDR13—and
r is the monthly change in net foreign assets (IMF IFS, lines
1–16c) scaled by lagged money base (line 14).14 To see how
q. (3.1) relates to the choice of exchange rate regime, we need
o use an intervention index to augment the original Frankel–Wei
ethod as follows:
e = α0 + α1USt + α2JPt + α3EUt
+γ Intervention Index + μt (3.2)
The α coefficients in Eq. (3.2) are often interpreted as implicit
urrency weights. The G3 currencies (in log differences) of US
ollar, euro, and yen (all per the SDR) are chosen, as they repre-
ent world currencies deemed to exert sufficient influence on the
ocal currency. While it is tempting to interpret these coefficients
s potential basket weights, it is probably more prudent for them
o be interpreted as “degrees of influence,” as it is very difficult
o say whether a high and significant coefficient value implies a
asket currency, or merely market-driven correlations.15
10 There is an interesting question as to why many countries in Asia and else-
here have a “fear of declaring” they are fixed or managed, especially since
here is no clear-cut evidence that markets punish countries with de facto or de
ure fixed rates in terms of demanding higher sovereign spreads. If anything, the
pposite seems to be the case (Barajas et al., 2008).
11 This section is based on Cavoli and Rajan (2010).
12 This is the same index used by Frankel and Wei (2007). However, they use
he term “EMP index” as opposed to “intervention index.”
13 The idea behind using the SDR revolves around finding a currency that is
ot excessively related to any of the currencies used in this study. A common
hoice in this literature has often been the Swiss franc, but there are concerns
hat its strong correlation with the euro may bias parameter estimates.
14 Reserve differences are scaled by lagged domestic monetary base in order to
ompare the magnitude of the reserve change in relation to the stock of money
ase in the system. The result is an index that is more easily interpretable than
f absolute values are taken.
15 It is also for this reason that we did not impose the restriction that all the
urrency weights should add up to one, or for that matter, why we do not just
estrict the parameters to take values between 0 and 1 (as there may be more
omplex correlations that we might know about a priori).
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Under Eq. (3.2), asγ → 1 the exchange rate per local currency
ecomes more flexible as the intervention index converges to the
ependent variable, e, and the α coefficients should be close
o zero and/or statistically insignificant. As γ → 0, the exchange
ate becomes more fixed and the extent of fixity to various major
urrencies is captured by the α coefficients.16
.2. Results
We use monthly data for the period 1999:m2 and 2009:m9, or
ome sub-periods thereof depending on data availability.17 Two
amples are presented for each country: one including and one
xcluding the final two years of the sample where results may
eveal the effect of the recent global financial crisis (Table 4).18
By and large the US dollar is the currency that has the greatest
egree of influence on local currencies. Results do not change
uch when we truncate the sample to the pre-global crisis
eriod, with the exceptions of Korea and India, the two coun-
ries initially impacted by a reversal of global capital flows. In
ssence, both central banks allowed much greater exchange rate
exibility during the crisis, and this shows up in terms of much
igher US dollar weights pre-crisis.
With the exceptions of Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Viet
am, the intervention index is statistically significant and there-
ore open to interpretation. The values are all under 0.1 in the
ases of the PRC, the Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and
hailand, and close to zero in many cases, suggesting there
xists a high deal of fixity in the local currencies (vis-à-vis a
ingle currency or basket of major currencies). The intervention
ndex has a slightly stronger economic weight in Indonesia and
ndia, suggesting these two economies allowed relatively greater
xchange rate flexibility than the others. The pertinent question
ere is, to what extent are these weights market-driven versus
olicy targets?
We can attempt to answer this by summarizing the interac-
ion between the currency weights and the intervention index.
e focus first on those currencies with intervention indices that
re at or close to zero and are statistically significant. The PRC’s
ase is the most clear-cut with the US dollar weight at 1, implying
ontinued heavy exchange rate management.19 The US dollar
16 In our estimations we do not impose any constraints on the γ coefficient;
hus, it could exceed one or be negative.
17 Two caveats should be noted. One, we prefer lower frequency data in terms
f month-to-month changes, as there is too much noise in low frequency data
day-to-day or month-to-month). High frequency data tends to tell us more about
d hoc interventions to minimize volatilities as opposed to degrees of influence
f G3 currencies. In addition, the data on reserves are only available on a monthly
asis, so there is a practical dimension to our choice as well. Two, reserve values
ould change because of currency fluctuations and, ideally, we should exclude
hese effects before estimation. However, this is not possible since we lack data
n the currency composition of reserves. This may impact the precision of the
esults in some cases.
18 Time dummies were also used with little success. As such, we decided that
resenting two sets of results will show more explicitly the effect of the crisis
n the exchange rate.
19 The weight on the US dollar declines marginally if we consider the sub-
eriod from 2006.
58
R.S.Rajan
/R
eview
ofD
evelopm
entFinance
2(2012)53–68
Table 4
Frankel-Wei Estimates by Country (Dependent Variable: Local currency per SDR).
Bang 1 Bang 2 PRC 1 PRC 2 Indon 1 Indon 2 India 1 India 2 Korea 1 Korea 2
Const 0.10 (0.30) 0.13 (0.27) −0.02 (0.53) 0.02 (0.62) −0.51 (0.001) −0.60 (0.001) −0.38 (0.00) −0.37 (0.002) 0.08 (0.70) −0.30 (0.02)
Dollar 0.93 (0.00) 0.97 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.02 (0.00) 0.19 (0.31) 0.33 (0.22) 0.36 (0.002) 0.60 (0.00) −0.23 (0.38) 0.40 (0.01)
Yen −0.001 (0.98) 0.04 (0.44) −0.01 (0.68) −0.02 (0.14) −0.20 (0.06) −0.06 (0.75) −0.09 (0.42) 0.03 (0.70) −0.19 (0.35) 0.32 (0.04)
Euro 0.08 (0.40) 0.18 (0.33) −0.001 (0.97) 0.02 (0.47) −0.03 (0.87) −0.06 (0.84) −0.02 (0.83) 0.09 (0.22) −0.33 (0.03) −0.15 (0.25)
Intervention Index 0.11 (0.08) 0.13 (0.06) −0.05 (0.03) −0.04 (0.04) 0.36 (0.00) 0.35 (0.00) 0.25 (0.00) 0.19 (0.00) 0.001 (0.92) 0.02 (0.09)
Adj R2 0.70 0.61 0.96 0.96 0.77 0.76 0.63 0.68 0.13 0.28
DW 1.69 1.63 2.32 2.18 2.40 2.44 2.13 2.00 1.89 1.79
Sample 02m1: 09m3 02m1: 07m12 01m3: 09m8 01m3: 07m12 99m2: 09m9 99m2: 07m12 99m2: 09m7 99m2: 07m12 99m2: 09m6 99m2: 07m12
Mal 1 Mal 2 Pak 1 Pak 2 Phil 1 Phil 2 Sing 1 Sing 2 Sri L 1 Sri L 2
Const −0.04 (0.47) −0.09 (0.04) 0.06 (0.42) 0.001 (0.99) −0.05 (0.71) −0.12 (0.42) −0.02 (0.01) −0.21 (0.002) 0.19 (0.10) 0.15 (0.26)
Dollar 0.77 (0.00) 0.86 (0.00) 0.98 (0.00) 1.11 (0.00) 0.80 (0.00) 0.82 (0.00) 0.32 (0.00) 0.44 (0.00) 0.94 (0.00) 0.92 (0.00)
Yen −0.05 (0.17) −0.05 (0.28) −0.02 (0.74) 0.01 (0.67) 0.004 (0.96) 0.05 (0.72) 0.04 (0.39) 0.12 (0.04) −0.05 (0.48) −0.01 (0.93)
Euro 0.08 (0.26) −0.001 (0.97) 0.07 (0.54) 0.15 (0.02) 0.08 (0.41) 0.06 (0.56) 0.09 (0.10) 0.13 (0.12) 0.06 (0.56) 0.09 (0.53)
Intervention Index 0.01 (0.24) 0.01 (0.33) 0.01 (0.75) 0.02 (0.39) 0.07 (0.004) 0.07 (0.01) 0.03 (0.00) 0.03 (0.002) 0.05 (0.05) 0.07 (0.01)
Adj R2 0.65 0.82 0.64 0.89 0.39 0.39 0.30 0.35 0.62 0.56
DW 1.84 1.94 1.61 1.92 2.11 2.04 2.03 2.08 1.66 1.61
Sample 99m2: 09m4 99m2: 07m12 01m3: 08:m6 01m3: 07m12 99m2: 08m12 99m2: 07m12 99m2: 09m8 99m2: 07m12 01m3: 08m12 01m3: 07m12
Thail 1 Thail 2 Viet 1 Viet 2
Const −0.29 (0.01) −0.31 (0.01) 0.11 (0.39) 0.04 (0.79)
Dollar 0.38 (0.00) 0.24 (0.07) 0.78 (0.001) 0.63 (0.02)
Yen 0.16 (0.04) 0.06 (0.63) 0.02 (0.49) −0.06 (0.09)
Euro 0.07 (0.43) −0.03 (0.76) −0.04 (0.68) −0.17 (0.15)
Intervention Index 0.07 (0.00) 0.09 (0.003) 0.05 (0.40) 0.07 (0.31)
Adj R2 0.36 0.38 0.67 0.66
DW 1.87 1.93 2.09 2.12
Sample 99m2: 09m9 99m2: 07m12 99m2: 09m2 99m2: 07m12
Source: Based on Rajan (2010).
Note: Includes lagged dependant variable. Figures in parentheses are p-values and those parameters significant at 10 percent or better are in bold. Sample is 1999m1 to 2009m9 for the first estimates for each country
and to 2007m12 for the second set. Any deviation from the full sample reflects the availability of data at the time of its acquisition. A one month lag dependent variable is included in all regressions and a one month
lag term for the US dollar per SDR is included for PRC, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Viet Nam if its inclusion helps to reduce serial correlation.
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eights for the Bangladesh taka, Sri Lankan rupee, and the
hilippine peso are surprisingly large, suggesting a high degree
f fixity. While this is consistent with the IMF’s categorization
f Sri Lanka and Bangladesh as both having conventional fixed
eg arrangements, it is at clear odds with the Philippines being
escribed as operating an “independent floating” arrangement.
hailand and Singapore also have low and statistically signifi-
ant intervention indices but with far lower US dollar weights
nd some positive and statistically significant weight to other
urrencies. This is indicative of management against a currency
asket, consistent with the official proclamations by the Mon-
tary Authority of Singapore (MAS) as well as an oft-noted
esire for currency basket pegging by the Bank of Thailand
BOT). Both are broadly defined by the IMF as being managed
oaters.20
Two other currencies characterized as managed floaters by
he IMF are India and Indonesia. As noted, both have relatively
igher intervention indices, suggestive of a greater degree of
xchange rate flexibility. The currency weights for Indonesia
uggest it is market-driven, as the α coefficients are either statis-
ically insignificant (US dollar and euro) or zero/negative (yen).
he Indian rupee appears to have a degree of flexibility in the
xchange rate with a possible loose US dollar peg. The interven-
ion index measures for Korea, Malaysia, and Pakistan are all
tatistically insignificant, implying there is insufficient evidence
rom the intervention index coefficient to suggest the existence
f any systematic exchange rate fixity over the sample period
nder consideration. However, examining the α coefficients, one
otes a high degree of influence of the US dollar and negligi-
le influences of the other currencies for Malaysia and Pakistan,
uggesting that both countries manage their currencies against
he US dollar.
To further check whether there has been a change in the degree
f intervention/flexibility in Asia over time, we undertake recur-
ive least squares estimates for the US dollar coefficient, α1. The
ecursive estimates are generated by running the regression for
q. (3.2) iteratively—beginning with k observations and record-
ng the coefficient values until we reach the full sample.21 Fig. 1a
nd b shows the recursive coefficients for the US dollar for the
nflation targeting countries versus the remainder of the countries
ampled (the non-inflation targeters). Generally, the influence of
he US dollar is lower for the inflation targeting group than for
he other group, as would be expected a priori. Fig. 2a–c suggests
hat the degree of influence of the US dollar is high across the
oard. While this is anticipated with the conventional fixed peg-
ers, we would expect the US dollar peg to have been lower for
he floating pair of Korea and (especially) the Philippines. Fig. 2b
or the managed floaters is broadly consistent with that regime
20 However, the lack of statistical significance of the non-US dollar-weighted
urrencies is odd.
21 k is the number of regressors. Due to insufficient degrees of freedom we
iscard the first few coefficient values—about three years’ worth. Recursive
LS is a special case of the Kalman Filter modeling strategy with time-varying
oefficients. These results are typically consistent with the rolling fixed window
egressions where one would drop the oldest observation before incorporating
he most recent.
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Fig. 1. Recursive least squares estimates for the US dollar weight.
hoice. The exchange rates in those countries with a lower US
ollar coefficient value—namely, Singapore and Thailand—are
lso influenced by other currencies, while the others tend to be
nfluenced more exclusively by the US dollar.
. Asymmetry in Asian exchange rate policies
The foregoing analysis makes apparent that, by and large,
sian currencies remain fairly heavily managed—mostly
gainst the US dollar, but sometimes against a basket of cur-
encies. The additional fact that the region has rapidly built up
eserves implies the currencies are effectively undervalued, pre-
umably in order to sustain export-led growth. This in turn has
ontributed to a massive reserve accumulation in emerging Asian
conomies as well as to ongoing global macroeconomic imbal-
nces. In other words, whereas Calvo and Reinhart (2002) noted
hat exchange rate policy in the 1990s in emerging economies
as best characterized as “a fear of floating,” we conjecture
hat Asian exchange rate regimes in the 2000s can be more pre-
isely described as being a “fear of appreciation” or a “fear
f floating in reverse,” a term initially coined by Levy-Yeyati
nd Sturzenegger (2007). Somewhat surprisingly, there has been
cant discussion of this possible asymmetry in foreign exchange
arket intervention in the debate over de facto exchange rate
60 R.S. Rajan / Review of Developme
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egimes in Asia, a gap that this section attempts to fill.22 We first
utline a simple model of optimal central bank behavior, which
erives a simple central bank intervention reaction function as
ur estimating equation.
22 Two notable exceptions are Ramachandran and Srinivasan (2007) and
rinivasan et al. (2008), who find evidence in the Indian context that support
he existence of asymmetric foreign exchange intervention (Indian rupee per US
ollar).
23 Sections 4.1 and 4.2 are based on Pontines and Rajan (2011).
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.1. Central bank intervention reaction function23
As noted, our focus is on managed floaters in
sia—specifically, India, Korea, the Philippines, Singapore,
hailand, and Indonesia—which are generally assumed to allow
alance of payments pressures to be partly reflected in exchange
ate changes and partly in foreign exchange intervention and
orresponding reserve changes. More formally, the central
ank is assumed to have full and direct control over a proxy
easure of intervention defined as the percent changes in
oreign exchange reserves (rt). The central bank intervenes
n the foreign exchange market to minimize the following
nter-temporal criterion24:
in
(Rt )
Et−1
∞∑
τ=0
δτLt+τ (4.1)
here δ is the discount factor and Lt is the period loss func-
ion. We follow Surico (2008) and Srinivasan et al. (2008) in
pecifying the loss function in linear-exponential form:
t = 12(r1 − r
∗)2 + λ
2
{
(et − e∗)2 + γ3 (et − e
∗)3
}
(4.2)
here λ > 0 is the relative weight and γ is the asymmetric pref-
rence parameter on exchange rate stabilization. et denotes the
ercent change in the exchange rate, r* is the optimal level of
eserves, and e* is the central bank’s target exchange rate, which
s assumed to be zero in this case. If γ < 0, deviations of the same
ize but opposite sign yield different losses and, thus, the rate of
ppreciation is weighted more heavily than the rate of deprecia-
ion. Analytically, ∂Lt/∂(et) = λ[et + (γ/2)(et)2] < 0, for et <
, for et < 0.
Two points of clarification should be noted. With regard to
he issue of why the level of reserves as opposed to deviation
atters, we can never of course be sure, as central banks do not
ake clear their objectives. That said, one might argue that cen-
ral banks are actually quite sensitive about declines in reserves
s they may be viewed by markets as a sign of some concern or
eakness (for instance, see Bird and Rajan, 2003). In relation
o this, the fact that many regional central banks rapidly rebuilt
heir reserves once the crisis abated further adds to the conjec-
ure that central banks arguably are very concerned about the
ctual reserve levels. By equating e* to zero, we are assuming
he choice by countries of a fixed exchange rate regime, which
s admittedly a simplifying assumption. That said, it is fairly
lear in some instances, such as Singapore, that the central bank
argets a particular level (within a range) as opposed to a rate of
epreciation per se. In any case, making the theoretical frame-
ork more general would not necessarily add much, if any, value
o the empirical results.
It is assumed that interventions can reduce the rate of changedepreciation/appreciation) in the exchange rate. Accordingly,
˜ t − e∗ = a0 + a1Rt + εt (4.3)
24 Data on actual central bank intervention are not available for the countries
onsidered.
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here a1 > 0 and the error term, εt, are independent and iden-
ically distributed (i.i.d.) with zero mean and variance σ2ε .
inimizing Eq. (4.2) by choosing Rt subject to the constraint
4.3) leads to the following intervention reaction function of the
entral bank:
t = R∗ − λa1Et−1
{
e˜t + γ2 (e˜t)
2
}
(4.4)
Replacing expected values with actual values, the empirical
ersion of the intervention reaction function can be simplified
s follows:
t = c + αe˜t + β(e˜t + vt) (4.5)
here α = −λa1 and β = −λa1γ/2. The reduced form param-
ters [α,β] allow us to identify the asymmetric preference on
xchange rate stabilization, γ . It can be shown that the asymmet-
ic preference parameter is γ = 2β/α. This parameter is the main
oncern of our empirical exercise in the next section (Surico,
008; Srinivasan et al., 2008).
.2. Results
Our estimation is based on monthly data for the sample
eriod between 2000:m1 and 2009:m7 for six emerging Asian
conomies: India, Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand,
nd Indonesia (largely the same set as in Section 3, excluding
he non-Indian South Asian economies of Bangladesh, Pakistan,
nd Sri Lanka, as well as Malaysia and the PRC, which main-
ained US dollar pegs until late 2005, and Viet Nam, which also
as a strong and growing de facto US dollar peg). This was the
eriod of rapid stockpiling of reserves in the region (i.e., after the
sian crisis of 1997–1998), including the global financial crisis
f 2008–2009, which started to have an impact on developing
nd emerging Asian countries’ balance of payments by early to
id-2008.
The variables used in the estimation are as follows: the
S federal funds rate, rt = (log Reservest) × 100 and e˜t =
 log et) × 100 with et being the nominal exchange rate
US dollar per domestic currency) and the nominal effective
xchange rate (NEER), respectively, such that a rise in each of
hese two alternative definitions of the nominal exchange rate
enote a currency appreciation, and vice versa. The data are
ourced from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics except
or the NEER, which is sourced from the Bank for International
ettlements (BIS).As implied earlier, Eq. (4.5) is the main equation of interest
n the empirical test.25 Table 5 reports the estimates of the inter-
ention reaction function as well as the asymmetric preference
25 The orthogonality conditions implied by the inter-temporal optimization-
ational expectations paradigm make the generalized method of moments
GMM) approach the appropriate method of estimating Eq. (4.4). We follow
ansen (1982) and use an optimal weighting estimate of the covariance matrix
hat accounts for both serial correlation and heteroscedasticity in the error terms.
ence we report robust standard errors. For the most part, constant, lagged val-
es (1–10, 12, and 15 months) of rt, et, as well as current and lagged values
1–4, 8, and 15 months) of the US federal funds rate are used as instruments.
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arameter. For each country we present two sets of results: Row
1) using the nominal bilateral exchange rate (US dollar per
omestic currency) and Row (2) using the NEER. The J test indi-
ates that the hypothesis of valid over-identifying restrictions is
ever rejected. The parameters on e˜t and α are statistically dif-
erent from zero in all cases. Of primary interest to us is the
arameter on the squared e˜t —the β coefficient. This is because
esting the restriction that H0: β = 0 is akin to testing H0: γ = 0.
is significant in all countries.
What are our prior expectations of the γ , the asymmetric
reference parameter? As noted in Section 4.1, a rise in the
ominal bilateral exchange rate (NEER) denotes an apprecia-
ion, implying γ should be positive. The asymmetric preference
arameter is significantly positive when either the nominal US
ollar per domestic currency exchange rate or the NEER is used
s the measure of the exchange rate (rise implies appreciation).
his implies that the central banks of these countries appear
o react differently to appreciation and depreciation pressures.
ore to the point, the responses of central banks in these coun-
ries to rates of appreciation are much stronger than to rates of
epreciations of the same value.26
The estimated asymmetric parameter is also much higher in
he case of the NEER than the nominal bilateral exchange rate for
hree of the six countries examined–namely, India, Singapore,
nd Thailand. For these three countries, the asymmetric prefer-
nce parameter, γ , ranges from 0.23 for India to a high of 0.71 for
ingapore when the nominal bilateral exchange rate is used, and
rom 0.69 for India to 4.57 for Thailand when the NEER is used.
he estimates of the asymmetric preference parameter for these
ame three countries are about two (Singapore), three (India),
nd seven (Thailand) times larger when the NEER is employed
s the regressor in the intervention reaction function compared
o when the nominal bilateral exchange rate is used. This implies
hat these three economies tend to pay more attention to manag-
ng their effective exchange rate than the US dollar rates. This is
onsistent with other studies that have estimated the degree of
nfluence of major currencies on the Asian economies since the
sian crisis and have found evidence of loose pegging to a bas-
et with the Japanese yen and euro also influencing movements
n the Asian currencies beyond the US dollar (as discussed in
ection 3). Once again, while this finding for Singapore is con-
istent with the fact that it officially pursues a “Basket, Band,
nd Crawl” (BBC) regime, with a basket essentially referring
o the NEER, two other countries in the region, Thailand and
ndia, are also believed to operate a de facto currency basket
rrangement.
. Exchange rate undervaluationMany emerging Asian economies have, like Japan, remained
ircumspect about allowing for a freely floating regime and con-
inue to manage their currencies heavily both to “lean against the
26 We have also tried the estimations for smaller sub-periods, such as the pre-
lobal financial crisis period (until early or mid-2008), and the results remain
ntact.
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Table 5
Intervention Reaction Function and Policy Preference Estimates, 2000:m1 – 2009:m7a,b
Country c α β γ = 2β/α J-test
India
Row (1) 1.958*** (0.160) −2.663*** (0.231) −0.308*** (0.050) 0.232*** (0.025) 15.45
Row (2) 1.202*** (0.089) −0.432*** (0.102) −0.148*** (0.035) 0.687*** (0.123) 16.25
Republic of Korea
Row (1) 0.479*** (0.092) −0.447*** (0.045) −0.104*** (0.013) 0.467*** (0.074) 14.78
Row (2) 0.568*** (0.086) −0.131*** (0.032) −0.019** (0.007) 0.291* (0.155) 14.58
Philippines
Row (1) 0.459*** (0.169) −0.872*** (0.127) −0.284*** (0.070) 0.651*** (0.113) 14.15
Row (2) 1.328*** (0.138) −1.014*** (0.093) −0.132** (0.054) 0.259*** (0.103) 14.05
Singapore
Row (1) 0.589*** (0.123) −0.297*** (0.90) −0.105*** (0.037) 0.707** (0.360) 12.94
Row (2) 0.991*** (0.144) −0.923*** (0.302) −0.716*** (0.236) 1.551*** (0.529) 12.66
Thailand
Row (1) 0.552*** (0.159) −0.571*** (0.114) −0.165*** (0.041) 0.578*** (0.196) 13.95
Row (2) 0.506*** (0.084) −0.437*** (0.086) −0.997*** (0.078) 4.567*** (0.647) 13.69
Indonesia
Row (1) 0.681*** (0.200) −0.894*** (0.166) 0.062*** (0.017) 0.140*** (0.020) 11.66
Row (2) 1.621*** (0.151) −0.722*** (0.104) −0.041*** (0.012) 0.113*** (0.022) 16.62
Source: Based on joint work with Victor Pontines (Pontines and Rajan, 2011).
a Specification: rt = c + α(et) + β(et)2 + vt.
b Standard errors using a four-lag Newey-West covariance matrix are reported in parentheses. Row (1) denotes that et is measured using the nominal exchange rate
of the US dollar per local currency, while Row (2) denotes that et is measured using the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER). J-test refers to the Hansen’s test of
over-identifying restrictions, which is distributed as a χ2(m) under the null hypothesis of valid over-identifying restrictions. A constant, lagged values (1 to 10, 12,
and 15 months) of rt, et as well as current and lagged values (1 to 4, 8, and 15 months) of the US Federal Fund Rate. The standard error of γ are obtained using the
delta method.
* denotes rejection of the null hypothesis that the true coefficient is zero at the 10 percent significance levels.
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r** denotes rejection of the null hypothesis that the true coefficient is zero at th
** denotes rejection of the null hypothesis that the true coefficient is zero at th
ind” as well as to manage short-term currency volatility.27 With
egard to the latter, given the heavy reliance of Asia on external
rade, FDI, and capital flows, the obvious desire by many Asian
olicymakers to minimize currency volatility (quite apart from
eaning against the wind) is understandable, even if the theoret-
cal and empirical evidence linking currency volatility to trade,
nvestment, and growth is not unambiguous (Eichengreen, 2009;
chnabl, 2007).28
Leaving aside for now the rather voluminous issue of the
mpact of currency volatility, we focus on the issue of cur-
ency undervaluation, which is arguably more controversial
iven its cross-border repercussions (“beggar-thy-neighbor” and
lobal imbalances). In particular, we offer a simple analytical
27 There may even be a degree of endogeneity in the sense that as countries
learn to float,” they gain a greater degree of monetary policy autonomy (see
akura, 2005). Of course, if unrestrained monetary policy has been a facet
f a country’s past, imposing exchange rate fixity may be an advantage as it
onstrains the active use of monetary policy.
28 There are technical issues in terms of how exchange rate volatility is mea-
ured, whether certain outliers drive the results, differentiating between volatility
nd valuations, and the underlying causes of volatility, among other questions.
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xposition of some of the issues relating to the PRC, East Asian
evelopment, and global imbalances using a simple two-sector
radables and non-tradables model.29
.1. Deﬁning the real exchange rate30
To understand the issue of real exchange rate undervaluation
t would be useful to remind ourselves that the real exchange
ate (RER) can be decomposed into two sets of relative prices:
he relative price of traded goods between countries (so-called
price competitiveness”) and the relative price of tradables and
on-tradables within a country. The (log) aggregate price index
an be expressed as a weighted average of the price of tradables
T) and non-tradables (NT):= (1 − α)pT + αpN for the domestic country (5.1)
29 We assume for simplicity a common terms-of-trade between importables
nd exportables such that they can be combined into “tradables.”
30 Sections 5.1–5.3 are based on Rajan and Beverinotti (2012).
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change rate, 1998–2010.
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nd,
∗ = (1 − β)pT∗ + βpN∗ for the foreign country (5.2)
Then the RER, q = s + p* − p, can be written as the sum of
he relative price of traded goods (a) and the relative price of
on-traded goods (b).
=
(a)︷ ︸︸ ︷
e + pT∗ − pT + β(pN∗ − pT∗) − α(pN − pT )︸ ︷︷ ︸
(b)
(5.3)
here a = e + pT∗ − pT and b = β(pN∗ − pT∗) − α(pN −
T ).
Given the increasing degree of trade openness of economies
o international trade flows, it is likely that the Law of One Price
n traded goods tends to hold over time (at least among the East
sian economies). If this is the case, the RER is primarily a
eflection of relative prices of tradables and non-tradables and
hus has implications for both internal resource allocations as
ell as external repercussions (on global imbalances).31
One simple, albeit highly imperfect, proxy for the RER would
e the ratio of the Wholesale/Producer Price Index or WPI/PPI (a
road measure of tradables) vis-à-vis the Consumer Price Index
r CPI (which consists of a significant share of non-tradables).32
ig. 3 reveals that while there have been some fluctuations in this
31 The empirical literature estimating variations in the real exchange rate (RER)
s mixed at best. For instance, Chinn (2000) finds some East Asian RERs (Japan,
orea, the Philippines, and Singapore) to be co-integrated with relative prices,
hile others (the PRC, Indonesia, and Thailand) are not. Parsley (2007) finds
hat about 60% of the variations in bilateral real exchange rates in East Asian
ilateral exchange rate movements can be explained by variations in the relative
rice of tradables and non-tradables. See Rajan and Beverinotti (2012) and the
iterature cited within.
32 Of course, not all components of the PPI (or WPI, for that matter) are tradable,
nd not all components of the CPI are non-tradable. A somewhat more precise
easure could be to examine the ratio of the trade index (i.e., exports plus
mports) to CPINT, (i.e., the consumer price index of those components that
re non-tradable). However, even such a measure is not without its problems.
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tFig. 4. Non-distorted equilibrium.
atio over the last decade, these movements have been within a
ather narrow range of 6% or so either way. Given the extraordi-
arily rapid growth of the economy during this period (9.5% on
verage between 1998 and 2009),33 the lack of discernible appre-
iation of the real exchange rate suggests a significant degree of
ndervaluation (we return to this point later in the paper).
.2. Mean reverting real exchange rate: no growth effects
Assume that the country was initially running a balanced
urrent account and produces and consumes at point 1, where
roduction (X) is equal to consumption (C) for both products
XT = CT and XNT = CNT), as in Fig. 4. The slope of the budget
ine is given by the relative price of tradables to non-tradables—
pecifically, even when many goods are tradable, not all of them are actually
raded (see Helpman et al., 2008).
33 According to the World Bank World Development Indicators.
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tFig. 5. Real exchange rate undervaluation in a static setting.
T /pNT , where pT = e × p∗T × (1 + s), i.e. e is the domestic
urrency per unit of foreign currency, p∗T is the world price of
radables, and s is the per unit net subsidy on domestic non-
radables.34
A RER undervaluation (accomplished via nominal devalua-
ion, subsidies, tariffs, etc.) leads to a steeping of the budget line
Fig. 5). The rise in the relative price of tradables leads to a shift
f domestic resources to that sector away from non-tradables
point 2) and a corresponding fall in the consumption of tradables
CT) and rise in the consumption of non-tradables (CNT) (point
).35 As can be seen, at the new equilibrium, XT > CT (X′t and′
t). Thus, the excess production of tradable goods is exported
verseas (especially to the US), helping East Asia generate large
nd sustained trade surpluses (defined as excess production over
onsumption of tradables). These trade surpluses in turn led to a
assive infusion of global liquidity and kept global credit condi-
ions exceptionally loose, financing—and possibly contributing
o—the trade and current account deficits abroad and the con-
equent global imbalances.36 However, on its own, the process
ould not persist forever.
As noted, at this new equilibrium, X′NT < C′NT . Thus, the
onundrum is why this undervaluation of relative non-tradables
rices persisted; by lowering the production of non-tradables
elative to consumption, why was its price not pushed up relative
o tradables—the so-called “mean reversion of the real exchange
ate”?37
34 Think of s as being the net of per unit tariff on imports and subsidy (financial
r otherwise) to domestically produced tradable goods (exports and/or import-
ompeting goods).
35 We assume here that substitution effect outweighs the income effect such
hat CNT rises.
36 While one school of thought argues that the US current account deficit was
nanced via capital inflows, the other school of thought, led by Ben Bernanke
2005), has argued that the global savings glut overseas led to large-scale capital
nflows into the US, causing lower long-term interest rates, increased consump-
ion and investment, and contributing to the worsening current account deficit.
lso see Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti (2009) and Wyplosz (2010).
37 There is a burgeoning literature that attempts to test if real exchange rates
re mean-reverting. For instance, see Gil-Alana (2000) and Jorap (2009).
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emand.
Conventional wisdom has been that the East Asian economies
ere able to keep a lid on the domestic demand for non-
radables via financial repression, which kept domestic credit
eined in while maintaining a high degree of fiscal restraint (since
overnment expenditures tend to fall overwhelmingly on non-
radables).38 As can be seen from Fig. 6, this implies a leftward
arallel shift of the budget line until we are back to a point
n the PPC like point 2, where the economy produces at point
′
NT and X′T . However, consumption is reined in to a point such
s 2′ where there is no disequilibrium in the non-tradables sec-
or and the economy continues to run a current account surplus
X′T − C′T ). Notice that compared to the original point 1 (where
here is no intervention), at point 2′ the economy consumes
elatively less of both tradables and non-tradables, implying
hat welfare must be lower (lower indifference curve). In other
ords, in the absence of any market failures, any government
ntervention must be welfare-reducing.39
While this combination of macroeconomic policies (real
xchange rate undervaluation and demand contraction) was
learly used by the PRC and its East Asian neighbors, given
he rapid pace of infrastructural and real estate development and
verall credit growth in that region, one would be hard-pressed to
rgue that demand for non-tradables was as heavily suppressed
s some economists have suggested. While the non-tradables
ector may not have grown as rapidly as the tradables sector,
t has, nonetheless, grown quite rapidly (Barnett and Brooks,
006). How does one reconcile this seeming discrepancy? Of
ourse, the easy answer would be that these countries—the PRC,
38 Of course, another way countries were able to keep the prices of non-
radables down was via direct price controls, though this merely transforms
he problem from one of prices to that of quantities and rationing (Huang and
ao, 2010).
39 It is plausible that point 2′ could be located below point 1, implying consump-
ion of non-tradables is the same; but at point 2′, the consumption of tradables
s lower than point 1, still implying lower welfare.
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ost notably—have an abundant supply of rural labor look-
ng for work in the fast-growing manufacturing sector, and this
abor surplus helped contain the wage costs and kept the price of
on-tradables down. This phenomenon—the so-called Arthur-
ewis “classic dual-sector model,” where wages are set in the
ural sector as supply of labor—is almost perfectly elastic.40
owever, while this may have been true in the early stages of
ndustrialization, most data suggests that wages started rising
airly quickly. Cai Fang (2007), for instance, has argued that the
RC has already reached a “Lewis turning point,” and that there
ill be significant upward pressures on industrial wages.41
But there is the broader question as to why, in the era of non-
ommodity based currencies, countries would ever want to bias
roduction toward the tradables sector, let alone run trade sur-
luses at the seeming expense of overall consumer welfare.42
he obvious answer here would be that, from a growth per-
pective, the demand for non-tradables is limited by the size
f the domestic market and is relatively inelastic, while that
or exportables is highly elastic. However, the problem with
his line of reasoning is that if market forces were allowed to
perate on their own, the price of non-tradables would fall rel-
tive to tradables, leading to a sectoral resource reallocation
ithout any need for government intervention in the form of
urrency undervaluation. The same point holds true if, as some
ave argued, export markets are more dynamic and allow a coun-
ry to rapidly move up the value-added chain. This implies that
he relative price of tradables will rise even more rapidly vis-
-vis nontradables and lead to a natural movement of resources
40 For a recent review of the model, see Kirkpatrick and Barrientos (2004).
41 Zhao (2010) offers a useful discussion of the predicament and policy con-
erns regarding migration of the PRC’s rural workers to the country’s urban and
ndustrializing areas.
42 More precisely, as noted later, the issue of biasing production towards trad-
bles and running a trade surplus do not always go hand-in-hand.
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nion with dynamic growth effects.
rom non-tradables to tradables without any need for government
ntervention.
.3. Dynamic growth effects and market failures
Rodrik (2008) has offered an explanation/justification for
he East Asian countries’ undervaluation policies. He argues
hat one must go beyond the usual (static) resource realloca-
ion effects, instead emphasizing dynamic gains from favoring
xport-linked manufacturing. These benefits could be in the
orm of learning-by-doing and demonstration effects that are
xternal to the firm. Thus, left to themselves, markets would
nder-produce such goods and government intervention could
ump-start growth via RER undervaluation to internalize these
xternalities. In other words, RER undervaluation could act as
form of industrial policy, helping to rapidly propel East Asian
conomies into global manufacturing powerhouses.43 Taking
his argument further, by channeling resources into the produc-
ion of tradables, there may also be some positive productivity
pillovers to the non-tradables sector helping to keep the out-
ut of that sector up despite the relative decline in its price. In
ther words, there may be dynamic expansionary effects which
alance, if not outweigh, the static contractionary effects.
The foregoing possibility is outlined more formally in Fig. 7.
he starting point is as before. To be more specific, the economy
s initially in equilibrium at point 1 and the RER undervalua-
ion changes the composition of consumption and production,
enerating a trade surplus and excess demand of non-tradables.
e know from previous explanation that this would not be sus-
ainable without demand compression. However, assume now
hat there are growth effects that make possible an outward
43 The Rodrik story is elaborated upon in a more sophisticated model by
orinek and Serven (2010) who show how undervaluation can help firms inter-
alize “learning by investing” spillovers in a two-factor model.
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consumption may need to be reconsidered, particularly in view
of the decline that is likely to occur in the trend growth in the
US and rest of the industrialized world over the medium-term.6 R.S. Rajan / Review of Deve
ovement of the production frontier.44 In the case where the
conomy experiences growth effects, the economy could be
n an equilibrium such as point 5 where the production and
onsumption of both tradables and non-tradables rise, thus
nambiguously increasing overall welfare (point 5 being north-
ast of point 1).
As before, if the country wanted to run a trade surplus for
hatever reason, it would require a degree of contractionary
ggregate demand policies such that consumption is below the
roduction frontier. The important point, though, is that even
t point 5′ it is plausible that the consumption of both tradables
nd non-tradables is higher than the initial equilibrium (point 1).
hat we have not explained is why the authorities would want
o run a trade surplus (i.e., choose point 5′, which is welfare-
nferior to point 5). In fact, many East Asian countries began the
rocess of effectively subsidizing the tradables sector far before
hey started running trade surpluses. Broadly, Aizenman and Lee
2008) refer to the former (i.e., supporting tradables, especially
xports) as “financial mercantilism” and the latter (i.e., trade
urpluses and reserve hoarding) as “monetary mercantilism.”
he latter may be due to a desire to build up net foreign assets
or precautionary purposes as a “war chest” against future crises
see, for example, Carroll and Jeanne, 2009; Durdu et al., 2009),
r the neo-mercantilist belief that exports are special (as opposed
o tradables more generally) (Korinek and Serven, 2010).
. Conclusion
This paper has examined the de facto exchange rate regimes
n emerging Asia. There is some evidence indicating a greater
egree of exchange rate flexibility in the regional economies.
owever, there is still a high level of fixity to the US dollar
egardless of the de jure exchange rate regime.
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2007) conjectured that
xchange rate policies have evolved toward an apparent “fear
f floating in reverse” or “fear of appreciation,” whereby inter-
entions have been aimed at limiting appreciations rather than
epreciations. Our results confirm the existence of an asymme-
ry in central bank foreign exchange intervention responses to
urrency appreciations versus depreciations in many develop-
ng and emerging Asian economies, particularly in the case of
ominal effective exchange rates (NEERs). This in turn rational-
zes the relative exchange rate stability as well as the sustained
eserve accumulation in the region.45
The paper went on to explore how real exchange rate under-
aluation in much of East Asia led to sectoral reallocation
f resources, which may in turn have helped transform them
nto industrial and export powers. In the scenario outlined in
his paper, if there are positive externalities from producing
44 The economy can produce the same amount of non-tradables, and more
radables with the same quantity of resources, or even more of both goods if
xternalities spill over from the tradables to nontradables sectors.
45 This is not to suggest that the policy was implemented mechanically at all
imes. Countries in Asia—India, Korea, and Indonesia, most notably—allowed
or greater currency flexibility during the 2007–2008 periods when there were
oncerns of commodity-induced inflation.
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radables, which might also benefit the non-tradables sector,46
t is plausible that the country is able to produce and consume
ore of both tradables and nontradables simultaneously. While
he country would still need to curb domestic demand if it desires
o run a trade surplus, we have shown that it could still be in
welfare-enhancing position compared to the case where the
arkets were able to operate freely. This seems to be a plausible
rowth story for East Asia and PRC. Of course, these policies
ave also contributed to external imbalances with the US as well
s globally. However, from the PRC’s perspective, why would
t consider changing its policy stance now if this undervalued
ER-based development strategy has indeed been so successful?
The dynamic growth story based on externalities from pro-
ucing more tradables as outlined above is unlikely to be valid
orever. It is generally believed that the productivity of the trad-
bles sector will outpace that of non-tradables and real wages
ill have to start rising over time as the country develops. The
RC has clearly been feeling intense price pressures in recent
imes.47 Indeed, a number of commentators have expressed con-
erns that such large-scale intervention runs a serious risk of
enerating increases in inflation in the intervening countries, and
ome have even suggested that such reserve accumulations have
layed a major role in the creation of excessive global liquidity.
ey to such issues is the extent to which monetary authori-
ies can successfully sterilize the domestic monetary effects of
eserve accumulation. Most monetary models of the exchange
ate and balance of payments assume no sterilization so that
arge reserve accumulations would automatically lead to rapid
rowth in domestic money and credit. Sufficiently high levels of
nternational capital mobility would make effective sterilization
mpossible, no matter the intensity of efforts of the domestic
onetary authorities.
Ouyang et al. (2010) and Ouyang and Rajan (2008) analyzed
hese issues for the PRC and India, respectively (pre-global
nancial crisis), and found that both countries had been able
o effectively sterilize a high proportion of their recent reserve
ncreases. If, however, the reserve build-up persists unabated and
he fiscal costs of sterilization begin to escalate (Calvo, 1991), it
s unlikely that the regional monetary authorities can persist with
ggressive sterilization on such a huge scale.48 In such a situa-
ion domestic macroeconomic stability could be compromised.
owever, this effective undervaluation of the currency and the
onsequent bias toward external demand as opposed to domestic46 Of course, stating that there may be market distortion is easy; providing
pecific evidence is a much tougher proposition.
47 Anecdotal evidence pointing to wage-price pressures and labor unrest in the
RC is growing (for instance, see Peaple, 2010 and The Economist, 10 June
010).
48 The World Bank (2005) and Mohanty and Turner (2005) discuss the latter
wo costs, and Rodrik (2006) discusses the issue of opportunity costs. These
osts need to be balanced against the likelihood that higher reserve holdings
educe a country’s perceived international credit standing, hence lowering the
ountry’s risk premium.
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A more sustainable strategy would be to allow its RER to
ppreciate somewhat and reorient production and consumption
oward non-tradables. If so, the PRC’s undervaluation policy
nd its hitherto export-led growth paradigm may have reached its
imits. Further yuan revaluation along with expansion of domes-
ic demand is likely necessary going forward. With regard to
he latter, substantial increases in domestic demand in the PRC
ould require domestic structural reforms, including removing
omestic cost distortions, upgrading domestic financial markets
nd safety nets, as well as reducing retained earnings of firms.49
ith regard to the former, the announcement by the PRC on 19
une 2010 that it will abandon its currency peg to the dollar and
anage the yuan more flexibly against a currency basket should
e viewed in this context.50
What does a more flexible (and presumably stronger yuan)
mply for the rest of Asia? The dynamics between the PRC’s
eal exchange rate and the rest of the region is complex. For
nstance, while it is commonly believed that a real exchange
ate appreciation of the yuan would benefit some other Asian
conomies with broadly similar comparative advantage (e.g.,
ndia and Viet Nam), allowing them to gain global market share,
t could also hurt others in the region as the PRC’s imports from
he region might decline as production networks between the
RC and Southeast Asia move elsewhere (Garcia-Herrero and
oivu, 2009).
Regardless of whether the PRC’s exports are a substitute or
omplement to other Asian economies, there appears to be a
risoner’s dilemma with regard to exchange rate policies in
sia, which in turn implies that there may be potential bene-
ts from pursuing a more coordinated approach to dealing with
onetary and exchange rate policies in the region.51 Certainly,
oordination does not imply straight-jacketing all countries in
he region to a common exchange rate regime. More specifi-
ally, rather than adopting a single currency immediately, Asian
conomies might gradually move toward pegging to a currency
asket—starting with individual currency weights and varying
xtents of flexibility around the pegs with a gradual convergence
ver time.
eferencesizenman, J., Lee, J.W., 2008. Financial versus monetary Mercantalism: long-
run view of large international reserves hoarding. World Economy 31 (5),
593–611.
49 See Goldstein and Lardy (2009), Huang and Tao (2010), and OECD (2010)
or discussions on structural reforms needed in the PRC. Qiao and Song (2009)
ffer a detailed overview of the PRC’s savings rate.
50 See the People’s Bank of China: http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english/detail.asp?
ol=6400&id=1488. It is important to keep in mind that the PRC did make a
imilar announcement on 21 July 2005, when it started allowing the RMB to
radually appreciate vis-à-vis the US dollar. That policy was put on hold from
uly 2008 as the PRC returned to a firm US dollar peg with the onset of the
lobal financial crisis because of concerns about export and growth slowdown
nd global deflation. See Frankel (2009) for an empirical evaluation of the PRC’s
xchange rate regime.
51 Park (2006) elaborates on the prisoner’s dilemma in East Asia and the central
ole played by the PRC.
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